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Paying Our Way in the World? Visible and Invisible Dangers of Brexit 
The UK economy has long been associated with a weak balance of payments, 
reflecting an underlying growth model reliant on private household consumption. 
A deficit in goods trade, chiefly with the EU, has been offset by surpluses in 
services trade and foreign investment earnings. The Single Market provided 
ZLGHUPDUNHWVIRUWKH8.EXWGLGQRWIXQGDPHQWDOO\DOWHU%ULWDLQ¶VVWUXFWXUDO
weaknesses. The Brexit vote took place against the background of Britain 
running its largest peacetime current account deficit. )LQDQFLQJ%ULWDLQ¶VH[WHUQDO
position represents a key challenge post-Brexit. Post-Brexit models for Britain 
partially address this. Any emergent model will critically depend on the nature of 
the Brexit deal with the EU, not least in terms of the impact on financial services 
and on supply chains. 
7KLVSDSHUVHWVRXWWKHUHFHQWHYROXWLRQRIWKH8.¶VFXUUHQWDFFRXQWSRVLWLRQ
particularly in relation to the EU. It then highlights particular areas of potential 
disruption from Brexit and sketches out scenarios of possible evolution of the 
%ULWDLQ¶VH[WHUQDOSRVLWLRQLQUHVSRQVHWRWKLV 
Keywords: word; Brexit, balance of payments, British growth model 
1. Introduction 
In 2016 the United Kingdom¶V current account deficit hit a peacetime record of more 
than 5 per cent of GDP. It has been claimed WKDWDFRXQWU\¶VFXUUHQWDFFRXQWHQWHUVa 
danger zone for sustainability around 5 per cent of GDP; indeed, the 5 per cent limit has 
often been taken as an early warning indicator for crises in emerging economies. There 
are, of course, key differences between Britain and emerging economies, but Brexit still 
poses an unprecedented challenge for the British economy. Although this deficit has 
fallen back since then, it remains high despite the depreciation of sterling since the June 
2016 referendum result. 
By definition, such a deficit requires overseas financing, leading Bank of 
England governor Mark Carney (channelling Blanche DuBois) to comment that Britain 
  
is now relying on the µNLQGQHVVRIVWUDQJHUV¶WRILQDQFHLWVH[WHUQDOGHILFLW (Carney 
2017). Brexit is widely forecast to have a negative impact RQ%ULWDLQ¶VWUDGLQJUHODWLRQV
and its ability to attract foreign investment. Much of the discussion has focused on the 
direct impact of Brexit on trade, but the effects on the capital account are key too as the 
UK will either have to continue to attract capital inflows to offset the current account 
deficit or to engineer a marked improvement in its current account position. The former 
would require continued international investor confidence in the UK; without a new 
economic strategy the latter could only be achieved through lower living standards.  
7KLVSDSHUH[DPLQHV%ULWDLQ¶VEDODQFHRISD\PHQWVLQWKHFRQWH[WRIWKH%ULWLVK
growth model. It examines the likely impact of Brexit on this, and how the economy 
may respond over the medium term to the challenges of achieving external balance. 
Section two RIWKLVSDSHUFRQVLGHUVWKHEDODQFHRISD\PHQWVLQWKHFRQWH[WRIWKH8.¶V
growth model, locating external deficits in terms of reliance on periodic consumption 
booms. Although Britain has a trade deficit, the worsening of the current account was 
mostly driven by the income balance, raising questions over its sustainability. Section 
three considers trade and current account developments, particularly in relation to the 
(86HFWLRQIRXUFRQVLGHUVWKHSRWHQWLDOLPSDFWRI%UH[LWRQ%ULWDLQ¶VH[WHUQDOSRVLWLRQ 
and the resulting policy implications; consensus forecasts predict significant losses from 
Brexit, but there may be policy strategies to mitigate this. Section five concludes. 
 
2. The British Growth Model and the Balance of Payments 
The United Kingdom has run a current account deficit almost continuously since the 
mid-1980s, averaging around 2 per cent of GDP (see figure 1). The UK experienced an 
extreme version of trends seen in other developed economies with deindustrialisation ± 
a relative decline in manufacturing employment and output. The UK experienced a 
  
particularly marked fall in the balance for manufactures, from high surpluses initially in 
the post-war period to continuous deficits from the early 1980s (Coutts and Rowthorn 
2013, Perraton 2015). Much of this deindustrialisation had occurred by the early 1990s, 
but the process has continued since and the manufacturing balance has continued to 
deteriorate with a strong fall in this balance from the mid-1990s. The UK has seen its 
share of world goods trade decline and this was forecast to continue even before Brexit 
(OECD 2017). These developments were of particular significance in the context of the 
Brexit referendum vote; key drivers of the vote to leave were voters in areas that had 
experienced deindustrialisation and negative effects of globalisation generally. 
 
[FIGURE 1 HERE] 
 
The long term deterioration of the manufactures balance was partially offset by 
improvements in the balance for other goods, notably through the impact of North Sea 
oil from the 1970s, and a clear improvement in the services trade balance from the mid-
1990s as shown in figure 2. Britain has a longstanding advantage in certain tradable 
services and from the 1980s the balance of services has improved significantly with the 
growth in net exports of knowledge-intensive business and financial services so that the 
8.LVQRZWKHZRUOG¶VVHFRQGODUJHVWexporter of commercial services. This has 
primarily been driven by growth in exports of financial and insurance services, 
particularly in the current century. 
 
[FIGURE 2 HERE] 
 
  
From the mid-1980s, though, the continued deterioration in the balance for 
goods trade has only partially been offset by improvements to the services trade 
balance. Before 2012 the UK¶V current account was usually supported by net inflows on 
the primary income balance, the difference between income earned by UK residents on 
investment abroad and income paid on foreign-held investments in the UK. This item 
fluctuated, but on average there was a rate of returns differential with the returns on 
British overseas assets exceeding returns on foreign-held assets held in the UK. There 
was something of a rentier economy element here, deficits on trade being partially 
offset by net overseas investment earnings despite a weakening net international 
investment position. The positive rates of return differential appears to have reversed 
since 2011. 
The balance of payments plays a key role in the operation of the British 
economic model. The µSULYDWLVHG¶RUµKRXVHSULFH¶.H\QHVLDQLVPXQGHUO\LQJWKH%ULWLVK
economic model has led to recurrent consumer spending booms based in part on rising 
property prices (Crouch 2009, Hay and Smith 2013); worsening trade deficits are in part 
the external counterpart to the falling households savings rates and rising debt 
associated with these consumption booms. Growth of credit is strongly associated with 
weakening current account positions. These developments can be traced back to the 
1980s with financial liberalisation and rising homeownership, leading to a marked 
GHWHULRUDWLRQLQ%ULWDLQ¶VH[WHUQDOSRVLWLRQMuellbauer and Murphy 1990). Anglo-
Saxon economies have evolved to this growth model, with weak current account 
positions (Baccaro and Pontusson 2016, Schwartz 2009). DurinJWKHµJUHDWPRGHUDWLRQ¶
period before the 2007/08 global financial crisis countries operating house price growth 
PRGHOVW\SLFDOO\H[SHULHQFHGIDVWHUJURZWKWKDQWKHµUHSUHVVHGULFK¶WKRVHFXUUHQW
account surplus countries which relied more on export-led growth (Schwartz 2009: ch. 
  
4). However, although consumption booms can promote short term growth, they are 
associated with slower longer term growth and credit crunch episodes (e.g. Kharroubi 
and Kohlscheen 2017). Household credit boom episodes tend to distort economic 
activity, channelling resources to low productivity sectors such as construction. The 
consolidation period following the end of debt build-up typically leads to financial 
instability, credit squeezes and subdued economic recovery. Commentators have noted 
WKHXQVXVWDLQDEOHQDWXUHRI%ULWDLQ¶VSUH-crisis household consumption boom. 
This Anglo-Saxon growth model is associated with relatively high levels of 
inequality. In the Britain case inequality rose significantly in the 1980s and early 1990 
and has largely stabilised since at relatively high levels. The links between inequality 
and current account positions are not straight-forward, but higher inequality does appear 
to be associated with a weaker current account position from periodic private 
consumption booms (Behringer and van Treeck 2015, Kumhof et al. 2012). In principle 
increased inequality could lead to a shortfall in aggregate demand and a current account 
surplus to the extent that richer households consume less than poorer ones; instead, 
Anglo-Saxon economies have seen periodic episodes where poorer and middle income 
households maintained desired consumption levels in the face of squeezed living 
standards through lower saving and higher borrowing with an associated deterioration in 
these FRXQWULHV¶FXUUHQWDFFRXQWSRVLWLRQV 
The consumption boom in Britain from the mid-1990s led to a real appreciation 
of the exchange rate and thereby a current account deficit. A domestic consumption 
boom raises the price of non-tradable goods. The Bank of England, as an inflation-
targeting central bank, responded to this rise in domestic demand by tightening 
monetary policy and thereby strengthening the currency. The real exchange rate 
appreciated from 1996 by around 20 per cent, and remained high until 2007 (see figure 
  
3); this appreciation was particularly marked relative to other European currencies 
(Dury et al., 2003). This is a highly schematic account, though; the strong real 
appreciation of sterling from 1996 cannot be explained entirely in terms of the monetary 
policy response and sterling appeared over-valued on some estimates. The Bank of 
England had no target for sterling, effectively regarding it as a macroeconomic shock 
absorber, and arguably neglected the impact of its appreciation on tradable industries 
including manufacturing (cf. Alvaro and Arestis 2007, Cobham 2006). The UK also 
benefited from terms of trade improvements, partly reflecting growing imports from 
low cost emerging economies. These developments helped to dampen inflationary 
pressures from expansion. 
 
[FIGURE 3 HERE] 
 
A current account deficit must by definition have its counterpart in net 
borrowing by sectors within the economy. The government has run a deficit since 2002. 
Although the fiscal deficit has been widely noted, the weakening of household balances 
- both in the run up to the financial crisis and during the post-crisis recovery ± also 
contributed to weakening the external balance. Partially offsetting this, the corporate 
sector has been in surplus for much of the period since 2003, reflecting subdued 
investment even before the financial crisis. This aggregate position though obscures key 
developments within this sector ± whilst non-financial corporations have usually been in 
overall surplus, financial corporations overall have been net borrowers. Thompson 
(2013) sets out in detail the accumulated debts of this sector and its substantial overall 
FRQWULEXWLRQWRWKH8.¶VWRWDOGHEWSRVLWLRQ6LQFHWKHRQVHWRIWKHILQDQFLDOFULVLVWKHUH
  
has been little private sector debt consolidation in the UK and much of that was by the 
non-financial corporate sector.  
Since 2007 sterling has depreciated, with broadly similar movements relative to 
EU countries and the rest of the world, but the current account deficit has also risen. 
This real depreciation has been a key channel through which living standards have been 
squeezed with real household incomes having flat-lined since the mid-2000s. In 
particular, the current account deficit has risen sharply from 2011 at a time when, 
although economic activity was recovering, it was still weak. By comparison, the only 
occasions in the post-war period when the UK had a comparable current account deficit 
were during the mid-1970s oil crisis and in the late 1980s at the height of the Lawson 
boom. The deterioration in the current account during previous episodes was primarily 
driven by a worsening trade balance. By contrast, %ULWDLQ¶Vrising current account deficit 
since 2011 has been largely driven by a marked deterioration in the primary income 
balance; around 80 per cent of the increase in the deficit was due to a fall in net income 
on direct investment (ONS 2016). Further, much of this was driven by transactions with 
the EU ± both a fall in returns on UK FDI in the EU and a decline in net FDI in the EU 
as British companies divest from Europe whilst European companies have increased 
their FDI in the UK. 
 
[FIGURE 4 HERE] 
 
7KLVLVSDUWRIDPRUHJHQHUDOVKLIWKLVWRULFDOO\PRYHPHQWVLQWKH8.¶VFXUUHQW
account were largely driven by developments in the trade balance. The trade deficit 
remains a key component of the current account and typically accounts for the majority 
of the deficit. However, during this century the majority of changes in the UK current 
  
account were accounted for by changes in the primary income balance (Bénétrix et al. 
2015, Forbes 2016). Financial globalisation processes before the 2007/08 crisis led to 
growth of cross-border financial flows amongst developed economies and rises in their 
external assets and liabilities over that period. The figures for the UK are exceptional so 
that both UK foreign and assets and liabilities now exceed 500 per cent of GDP, having 
risen from around 150 per cent in 1997. These figures have fallen from their peaks with 
the decline in cross-border financial flows since the crisis (Forbes 2014; Bank of 
England 2015). More than half of British external assets and liabilities are accounted for 
by financial institutions. 
The rate of return differential is volatile and not fully understood. ThH8.¶V
position partly reflects the portfolio mix of UK assets ± the UK has a positive net asset 
position in foreign direct investment (FDI), which would be expected to have relatively 
high returns, but it also reflects differences in the nature of the UK EDQNLQJV\VWHP¶V
foreign asset and liability profile. In particular, the UK has run a persistent positive 
returns differential on FDI whereas the yield differentials for equity were typically 
negative (Bordon et al. 2016). The recent weakening of the primary income balance 
PD\UHIOHFWUHODWLYHO\VKRUWWHUPIDFWRUVEXWLWFDQQRWVLPSO\EHDVVXPHGWKDW%ULWDLQ¶V
past positive rates of return differential will persist indefinitely or that the income 
inflows will return to earlier levels.  
7KH8.¶VLQFUHDVHGFXUUHQWDFFRXQWGHILFLWVLQFHKDVODUJHO\EHHQILQDQFHG
by FDI inflows, with EU investors accounting for a majority of these flows whilst 
British companies have divested from the rest of the EU over this period (ONS 2016). 
7KHUHVXOWLQJGHFOLQHLQQHW)',LVOLNHO\WRZHDNHQWKH8.¶VSRVLWLYHUHWXUQV
differential given the historic positive returns differential on FDI. Thus, the UK has 
continued to be able to attract inward investment flows from overseas (mostly 
  
European) companies, although these flows are still relatively low ± as a percentage of 
GDP these flows are now only around half the average levels of inflows since 1988 
(Bank of England 2015). TKH8.¶V net international investment position worsened 
during the 1960s and 1970s, but improved substantially in the 1980s peaking in the 
mid-1980s. During the 2000s the net international investment position remained broadly 
stable relative to GDP even with continuous current account deficits; since 2012 the net 
international position has deteriorated, although this partly reflects valuation effects. 
There are considerable margins of error in estimating external wealth in relation to 
valuation of the total foreign assets and liabilities. Nevertheless the most recent 
estimates shown in figure 5, and based on wider surveys than hitherto, have revised 
downwards earlier measures RI%ULWDLQ¶VQHWLQWHUQDWLRQDOLQYHVWPHQWSRVLWLRQpoint to a 
greater fall since 2007 despite the positive valuation effects of sterling depreciation. 
These revisions also point to continued worsening of relative returns on assets.  
 
[FIGURE 5 HERE] 
 
The UK is approaching Brexit with a large current account deficit despite 
subdued economic activity and sterling depreciation. The IMF estimated that the UK 
has an excess current account deficit relative to long term fundamentals (demographics, 
relative growth potential and net foreign asset position) even before the Brexit vote 
(IMF 2017). A weak trade position was compounded by a negative primary income 
balance from 2011. Britain has continued to attract FDI inflows to finance this deficit, 
mostly from EU-27 companies, and its net international investment position appears to 
have weakened. Previously the UK had been able to earn a net positive return on 
  
overseas assets despite an apparently negative net international investment position, but 
this may be weakened by a fall in the net FDI position. 
 
3. The European Union and the 8.¶V External Position 
%ULWDLQ¶VWUDGHDQGILQDQFLDOUHODWLRQVZLWKWKHUHVWRIWKH(8DUHFHQWUDOWRLWV
overall external position. The EU accounts for around 45 per cent of British exports of 
goods and services, a share that has fallen from around 55 per cent at the start of the 
century. Imports from the EU account for around 54 per cent of UK imports; a figure 
that has been broadly stable this century. These figures understate the role of the EU in 
British trade given the preferential trading arrangements with over 50 further countries. 
With relatively slow growth in the Eurozone and the broader shifts in global patterns of 
HFRQRPLFDFWLYLW\DIDOOLQWKH(8¶VVKDUHof British exports is a predictable 
GHYHORSPHQWDQGWKH(8UHPDLQV%ULWDLQ¶VODUJHVWWUDGLQJSDUWQHU$FOHDUGHILFLWRQ
goods trade is partially offset by a surplus on services trade. Britain has a small trade 
surplus with the rest of the world (chiefly with the US). As noted, the primary income 
account position has shifted to a deficit. The EU accounts for a similar share of foreign 
investment stocks; FDI in the EU accounts for around 41 per cent of the UK total, with 
the EU accounting for 43 per cent of total inward FDI in the UK. These shares have 
fallen from around half earlier in this century.  
Forecasts of a negative impact from Brexit are largely expected to operate 
through lower trade and FDI inflows. Trade integration through the European Single 
Market is presumed to have pro-competitive effects raising productivity and lowering 
price mark-ups. FDI is also expected to stimulate competition and promote the transfer 
of best practice technology. Estimates of losses from leaving the Single Market assume 
that much of these gains would be lost with Brexit. 
  
This should be seen in context. Although completion of the Single Market 
programme raised trade within the EU, British goods exports rose less rapidly than 
WKRVHRIRWKHU(XURSHDQHFRQRPLHVDQGWKH8.¶Vshare of the EU market has fallen. 
Much of this can be explained by the relatively high exchange rate before 2007, but it 
also reflects weaknesses in key industries (Barrell et al. 2006, Buisan and Sebastia-
Barriel 2006). Since the formation of the Single Market, Mayer et al. (2017) found that 
%ULWLVKILUPV¶VDOHVWRRWKHU(8PDUNHWVKDYHUHPDLQHGVWDEOHDWUHODWLYHO\ORZOHYHOVDV
a share of total sales, in contrast to other European firms who have expanded their sales 
tRWKHUHVWRIWKH(8RYHUWKHVDPHSHULRG%ULWLVKILUPV¶VDOHVWRFRXQWULHVRXWVLGHWKH
EU have risen sharply as a proportion of their sales. Amongst the largest firms these 
trends have been even more pronounced with sales to other European countries falling 
as a proportion of total sales of large UK companies. Major British firms have also been 
particularly active in offshoring production to low wage economies (Marin et al. 2015). 
This is all consistent with FDI developments as British firms divested from Europe. 
The UK retains some key areas of advantage in advanced manufacturing, but 
overall it has continued to lose market share in high technology manufactures. The entry 
of China and other emerging economies into global markets was associated with lower 
export shares for most major developed economies, including the UK. The relative 
technology intensity of exports is significantly associated with changes in export share 
and %ULWDLQ¶VIDOOLQJUHODWLYHWHFKQRORJ\LQWHQVLW\VLQFHWKHPLG-1990s partly explains 
WKHGHFOLQHLQ%ULWDLQ¶VVKDUH of world export markets over this period. In addition to 
adverse exchange rate movements, UK exports continue to suffer from longstanding 
weaknesses in non-price competitiveness. Benkovskis and Wörz (2014) show that the 
UK¶VORVVRIH[SRUWVKDUHZDVODUJHO\GULYHQE\SULFHIDFWRUVIURPWKHPLG-1990s, 
reflecting sterling appreciation; however, from the 2000s non-price competitiveness 
  
H[SODLQVDQLQFUHDVLQJSURSRUWLRQRIWKHFRQWLQXHGIDOOLQWKH8.¶VVKDUHRIJOREDO
markets and accounts for the majority of the fall since the financial crisis. In general, the 
limited effect of the Single Market is not surprising; the programme was more extensive 
in eliminating barriers to cross-border trade in manufactures than for services (Mustilli 
and Pelkmans 2013), frequently across goods in which the UK does not have a strong 
comparative advantage. The European Commission has regularly noted the limited 
development of a single market in services. Successive British governments have 
pushed for deepening of the Single Market to promote services trade within the EU. 
It should be noted that the impacts here will critically depend on a small number 
RIILUPV$URXQGKDOIRIWKH8.¶VRXWZDUG)',VWRFNLVDFFRXQWHGIRUE\
multinational companies, with 25 overseas multinationals accounting for a third of the 
inward investment stock in the UK (ONS 2016). The majority of the fall in FDI 
earnings that led to the deterioration of the current account position since 2011 was due 
to the top 5 per cent of multinationals. Similarly the top 1 per cent of UK exporting 
companies account for around a quarter of total British exports and the top 5 per cent 
account for more than half (Marin et al. 2015). As already noted British companies are 
relatively oriented to non-EU markets and suppliers; the medium term effects of Brexit 
will partly depend on the strategic decisions of a small number of major companies. 
Over the longer term, growth must be consistent with balance of payments 
equilibrium; the UK patterns of specialisation are biased towards exports with relatively 
low income elasticities of demand whilst the UK tends to have relatively high demand 
for imports. This implies a relatively low long run growth rate consistent with balance 
of payments equilibrium (cf. Garcimartín et al. 2012); faster growth is possible in the 
short term, but this tends to be followed by a period of subdued growth. To the 
H[WHQWWKDW%UH[LWZHDNHQV%ULWDLQ¶VH[SRUWSRVLWLRQORQJHUUXQJURZWKZRXOGEH
  
reduced. Current account imbalances reflect underlying macroeconomic conditions and 
therefore it cannot simply be assumed that these could be improved by reorienting trade 
from countries with which Britain has bilateral deficits in the EU towards countries with 
which Britain currently runs a surplus. 7KH(8UHPDLQVFHQWUDOWR%ULWDLQ¶VWUDGHDQGWKH
evolution of its external position. 
 
4. The Potential Impact of Brexit 
Before the referendum official analysis predicted a range of negative developments in 
the immediate aftermath of a Brexit vote (HM Treasury 2016a), and independent 
forecasters made similar predictions. In the event, although the fall in sterling was 
broadly in line with expectations and inflation rose from higher import prices, the 
British economy did not experience a recession and unemployment continued to fall. 
Asset prices did not fall and there was no major increase in the premium on lending to 
UK businesses and households. Foreign demand for UK gilts has been strong since the 
referendum result and the UK has continued to attract FDI inflows, although there has 
been some decline in other inflows. 
Growth since the referendum result, though, has almost entirely been driven by 
consumer expenditure as household savings rates fell to record lows and household 
debt-to-income ratios rose to levels close to their pre-financial crisis peaks. Moreover, 
forecasts indicate that this is likely to continue with little or no improvement in net 
exports (OBR 2018). Thus, activity has been maintained through a resumption of the 
debt-fuelled household consumption growth model, but this cannot be maintained 
indefinitely.   
Sterling depreciation episodes since 2007 have only had a limited impact on 
raising exports. The initial fall from 2011 only led to limited improvements in export 
  
performance as many companies used a lower pound to raise their margins rather than 
expand overseas sales (SPERI 2014). The depreciation of sterling following the 
referendum vote has had some effect on expanding export volume, but again producers 
have raised margins.1 This will not necessarily lead to higher investment in export 
industries ± if the fall in sterling is in anticipation of Brexit then this may reflect higher 
expected costs of trading; alternatively, the fall may, at least in part, be a temporary 
response to short run developments. It is not surprising that exporters have raised 
margins ± profitability in the tradable sectors has been persistently lower than in non-
tradable sectors, in part from the earlier period of real appreciation of sterling (cf. 
Broadbent 2017). 7RWKHH[WHQWWKDWWKHGHWHULRUDWLRQRIWKH8.¶VWUDGLQJSRVLWLRQ
reflects weaknesses in non-price competitiveness it cannot simply be offset by sterling 
depreciation but would require further investment in tradable industries.  
Consensus forecasts indicate that Brexit will have a negative impact over the 
longer term is through reduced trade and FDI inflows. There is clearly considerable 
uncertainty over this, not least over the nature of the final arrangements after leaving the 
EU. Current projections are that post-Brexit arrangements will lead to Britain leaving 
WKH6LQJOH0DUNHWZLWKWKH%ULWLVKJRYHUQPHQW¶VSUHIHUUHGRXWFRPHWREHWRQHJRWLDWHD
specific free trade agreement preserving tariff-free access to EU markets. The 
complexity of such trade negotiations effectively precludes concluding a final deal 
before Britain leaves the EU. Treasury forecasts before referendum predicted that GDP 
would be around 3-10 per cent lower over a decade against a baseline, depending on the 
nature of the final settlement (HM Treasury 2016b). Most forecasts made similar loss 
projections, some estimating that the hardest Brexit option of defaulting to trading on 
WTO rules would lead to even higher losses (e.g. Ebell and Warren 2016, Emmerson et 
al. 2016, OECD 2017, Van Reenen 2016). These studies also predict that Brexit would 
  
lower immigration, although not by the levels projected by the government, with a 
further negative impact on output and productivity. Brexit has the potential to disrupt 
suppO\FKDLQVLQWKH8.,QWHUPHGLDWHVQRZDFFRXQWIRUDPDMRULW\RIWKH8.¶VWUDGHLQ
goods and services with the EU is in reflecting integration with European supply chains, 
and these exports and imports have grown during the current century (Levell 2018). 
Reportedly 63 per cent of supply chain managers in the EU27 with UK suppliers are 
planning to move some of their supply chains from the UK and around 40 per cent of 
British companies are looking to move away from EU suppliers.2 
Estimates of potential losses from Brexit are clearly subject to margins of error. 
Gudgin et al. (2017) estimate that the Treasury study and similar independent estimates 
are likely to overstate the impact of Brexit. Such estimates are based on the now 
standard gravity model of trade and FDI, estimating the additional stimulus to flows that 
(8PHPEHUVKLSSURYLGHVEH\RQGWKHµQDWXUDO¶OHYHOVSUHGLFWHGE\WKHJUDYLW\PRGHO
(and other controls). The gravity estimates of the impact of EU membership are based 
on average effects across a large number of economies; Gudgin et al. (2017) note that 
this is an average effect and re-estimate a gravity model for a more representative 
sample and report a lower expected impact of Brexit on trade and FDI. Gudgin et al. 
(2017) also query the assumed impact of Brexit on productivity in the estimates from 
the Treasury and others; in particular, the estimated impact of lower trade and FDI on 
productivity is based on an average effect across a wide range of economies; a narrower 
focus on developed country evidence suggests smaller effects of changes in trade and 
FDI on productivity. Much of inward FDI into the UK is in the form of mergers and 
acquisitions rather than new capital investment; this form of FDI is likely to have a 
lower impact on productivity than new investment in the capital stock. Gudgin et al. 
  
(2017) estimate that supportive macroeconomic policy and a lower pound could largely 
offset any negative impact. 
Beyond the details of any future trading arrangements with the EU, there is no 
clear post-%UH[LWHFRQRPLFPRGHO9LVLRQVRIDµJOREDO%ULWDLQ¶DVDIUHHWUDGLQJQDWLRQ
with low taxes and regulation negotiating bespoke trade deals (and/or pursuing a global 
services trade deal) have large elements of continuity with the current model. Defaulting 
to WTO rules would lead to further erosion of the manufacturing sector through the 
elimination of remaining tariffs; assumptions that adjustment to this would be smooth 
are belied by historical experience. The UK already has some of the lowest product and 
labour market regulations, and lowest corporate tax rates, amongst developed 
economies; the OECD (2017) identifies low skill provision and infrastructure 
ZHDNQHVVHVUDWKHUWKDQUHJXODWLRQDVFHQWUDOWRWKH8.¶VSRVW-crisis stagnation in 
productivity. Further, if the Britain has a negotiate post-Brexit arrangement, rather than 
moving to WTO rules, then this is likely to retain some degree of regulatory alignment 
with the EU. The UK has attracted inward FDI flows, but there is little evidence that 
further deregulation and corporate tax reductions would significantly increase inflows. 
The challenge of balance of payments adjustment post-Brexit is to provide 
mechanisms for the UK to improve its current account position over the medium term 
and finance continueGGHILFLWVRYHUWKHVKRUWWHUP9LVLRQVRIDµJOREDO%ULWDLQ¶HFKR
VXFFHVVLYH8.JRYHUQPHQWV¶SROLF\DVVXPSWLRQVthat the UK can be expected to gain 
significantly from increased services trade with high income elasticity of demand for 
commercial services and on-going negotiations to reduce barriers to services trade both 
regionally and globally. The issue here is whether the combination of global growth and 
possible services trade liberalisation could generate the expansion in UK commercial 
services trade that could compensate for a deteriorating goods balance. Barattieri (2014) 
  
notes that economies with a comparative advantage in services tend to run current 
account deficits and those with a comparative advantage in manufactures tend to run 
surpluses. Further analysis indicates that global services trade liberalisation could 
UHGXFHWKH8.¶VFXUUHQWDFFRXQWGHILFLWE\DURXQGSHUFHQWRI*'3-R\et al., 
2018). Quantifying the degree of policy barriers to services trade services is complex, 
but estimates indicate that such barriers to services trade remain substantially higher 
than for trade in manufactures (Borchert et al. 2014); barriers to global manufactures 
trade have fallen significantly from the 1990s whilst services trade barriers appear little 
changed over the same period (Miroudot et al. 2013). As such, there is much greater 
potential for liberalisation of services trade both globally and specifically in Europe. 
Estimates indicate that withdrawal from the Single Market itself could cost the 
UK services sector up to 2 per cent of GDP (CEBR 2017, Emmerson et al. 2016). The 
position of the City of London faces competitive challenges, although it is likely that the 
City would still be able to retain much of its business post-Brexit; London has 
longstanding advantages relative to other financial centres in its time-zone, notably in 
terms of established networks and the common law system (SPERI 2017). At least some 
sections of the UK financial services industry would prefer a Brexit deal beyond EEA 
membership with regulatory alignment; Single Market membership outside the EU 
would leave the UK subject to EU financial services rules without any formal input to 
their development. Britain appears likely to leave the Single Market but attempt to 
negotiate a trading arrangement preserving tariff free trade with the EU; this would 
result in services trade with the EU facing greater barriers than goods trade.  
There would be challenges to expanding services trade beyond the EU to 
compensate for any loss of trade after Brexit. British services exports beyond the 
traditional markets of Europe and North America remain small. India apart, the UK has 
  
relatively low services exports to the major emerging economies but these have grown. 
There is a particular issue here that services trade frequently requires mobility of labour 
given the nature of the product and the requirement for interaction between suppliers 
and consumers; the tradable services industry has also been a key employer of foreign 
labour. Global negotiations for liberalisation through the WTO are effectively stuck, 
though. The EU is currently party to negotiations of 23 WTO members for a Trade in 
Services Agreement (countries that together account for 70 per cent of world services 
trade), but negotiations are currently on hold. There is the potential for services trade 
liberalisation to raise UK exports, but the political economy currently militates against 
negotiating trade liberalisation deals either globally or bilaterally. Further, broader 
global trends may also have become less favourable. Before the financial crisis the 
continuation of globalisation processes was largely assumed and it was widely predicted 
that growth of global services trade would accelerate. Since then, although services 
trade has been more resilient than trade in goods, there has been a downturn in global 
services trade since the crisis. There has been clear retrenchment of financial 
globalisation since the crisis; although this primarily reflects a decline in international 
capital flows, particularly cross-border banking, this may also impact on commercial 
services trade more generally (Credit Suisse Research Institute 2017, Forbes 2014, 
McKinsey 2016). The assumption of continued strong growth in global services trade, 
and with it demand for UK exports, may not hold. 
Although deindustrialisation is common across developed economies, 
manufacturing is particularly weak in the UK even relative to comparable economies. 
Weak performance alongside some high technology strengths reflects a long tail of 
FRPSDQLHVZLWKORZSURGXFWLYLW\DQGH[SRUWV2(&'7KLVLVFHQWUDOWR%ULWDLQ¶V
high regional inequality ± these companies are concentrated in poorer regions that also 
  
have greater exposure to EU trade. Exports and productivity could be raised if the gap 
between leading British companies and laggards were to be reduced; this would not 
necessarily entail directed industrial policy, but would require not simply the greater 
provision of skills and infrastructure but also a specific regional dimension to such 
measures. Gudgin et al. (2017) advocate fiscal expansion to mitigate the impact of 
Brexit. More generally, there is a case for higher public investment with an emphasis on 
lagging regions (Weisbrot and Merling 2018); whilst this would not directly address 
trade, it would be likely to boost capacity in these regions and encourage private 
investment. This could also promote more broadly-based growth that would tend to 
reduce inequality, both individual and regional. 
Consensus estimates indicate a negative impact of Brexit, although this may be 
limited with a negotiated arrangement to preserve tariff-free trade. Large British 
companies are already relatively oriented in their sales towards non-EU markets and 
KDYHGHYHORSHGH[WHQVLYHRIIVKRULQJQHWZRUNV%ULWDLQ¶VUHODWLYHDGYDQWDJHLQVHUYLFHV
could provide the basis for export expansion, but negotiating further liberalisation 
through bilateral agreements or globally through the WTO appears problematic. 
Further, the pre-crisis phase of rapid growth of global services trade may have passed. 
The key to addressing the trade challenges of Brexit may lie less in targeting leading 
edge sectors than in addressing longstanding weaknesses of lagging companies and 
regions. 
 
5. Conclusions 
Brexit is being undertaken at a time when the UK is running a large current account 
deficit, despite subdued economic activity and sterling depreciation since the 
referendum result. A weak external balance position is a corollary of the British growth 
model that has emerged from the 1980s ± periodic private consumption booms leading 
  
to a deterioration of the current account and a financial sector that has accumulated high 
past debts. Underlying this is an economy characterised by high inequality and latterly 
weak productivity and stagnating real incomes. Deindustrialisation left the UK with a 
relatively weak manufacturing sector; this was only partially offset by a sustained 
improvement in the services trade balance. The rise in inequality from the 1980s 
reflected a combination of structural changes and policy choices; deindustrialisation and 
the rise of the financial services sector have raised inequality, both personal and 
regional. 
Although strong growth in services exports partially offset a worsening trade 
balance from deindustrialisation, the current account was previously supported by 
surpluses on the primary income balance reflecting a favourable rate of returns 
differential on British overseas assets. This now appears to have been eroded as 
%ULWDLQ¶VQHWLQWHUQDWLRQDOLQYHVWPHQWSRVLWLRQKDVZHDNHQHGRYHUWKHPHGLXPWHUP
Britain thus needs to raise its net exports. Brexit is likely to aggravate these 
developments, both through its impact on trade but also on foreign investment flows. If 
foreign investors respond to Brexit by increasing the risk premium required on 
investment in the UK then this would erode further any positive rates of return 
diffHUHQWLDO7KH(8LVFHQWUDOWRWKH8.¶VSULPDU\LQFRPHEDODQFH$NH\PHFKDQLVP
for adjustment since the financial crisis has been the depreciation of sterling; this has 
only had a limited effect on stimulating exports, but has been significant in squeezing 
living standards. 
Any continued current account deficit requires funding. In short term it now 
appears unlikely that Brexit will lead to a sudden stop balance of payments crisis of the 
type seen in emerging economies in the 1990s. There remains strong demand for UK 
gilts and as yet no indicators of a rise in the risk premium, whilst outstanding UK 
  
government debt is relatively long-dated. The currency composition of UK overseas 
assets and liabilities is favourable. There have been outflows on some assets; a sudden 
loss of confidence could still precipitate further falls in sterling. 
The challenge over the medium term is to expand net exports to compensate for 
deterioration of the primary balance and the negative impact of Brexit on trade with the 
EU. There are few precedents for a policy change in a developed economy of this 
magnitude. A post-Brexit settlement that largely preserved market access might lead to 
relatively small losses. One that leads to significant disruption of financial services trade 
and production networks could potentially lead to losses comparable to a major 
recession. Whilst past precedents of major adjustment to balance of payments 
disequilibrium amongst developed economies are limited, they do point to much of this 
occurring through pressure on living standards. Although the UK has continued to 
attract inward investment since the Brexit vote to offset the current account deficit, 
these inflows may not continue at current levels. BriWDLQ¶Vability to attract FDI inflows 
may weaken as Brexit makes the UK a less attractive location for overseas companies 
2YHUDOO%UH[LWSRVHVPDMRUFKDOOHQJHVWR%ULWDLQ¶VH[WHUQDOEDODQFH:KDWHYHU
the final settlement, trade is particularly vulnerable in key areas ±%ULWDLQ¶VVWURQJ
position in commercial services trade, not least with the EU, is likely to be undermined. 
The UK is thus likely to continue to run a current account deficit. A fall in sterling is 
XQOLNHO\WRERRVWQHWH[SRUWVVXIILFLHQWO\,QWKHµJOREDO%ULWDLQ¶YLVLRQWKH8.PD\
negotiate new trade agreements to boost exports with non-EU countries, but it is 
unlikely that these could offset lost EU trade. An alternative strategy may be to raise 
public investment in infrastructure and skills, particularly in lagging regions.  
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Figure 1: UK Current Account Balance (per cent of GDP) 
 
Source: Office for National Statistics 
 
  
  
Figure 2: United Kingdom Services Balance as Per Cent GDP 
 
Source: Office for National Statistics 
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Figure 4: UK current account balance and constituent parts as a percentage of nominal 
GDP, 1995 to 2015 
 
 
 
Source: Office for National Statistics 
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Figure 5: UK Net Foreign Assets/International Investment Position (% GDP)  
 
Source: Office for National Statistics 
1
 See the ONS analysis at: 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/inflationandpriceindices/articles/theimpactofster
lingdevaluationonpricesandturnoverinthemanufacturingsector/2017-09-15 
2
 &KULV*LOHVµ8.-(8VXSSO\FKDLQVEHJLQWREUHDNDPLG%UH[LWWUDGHIHDUV¶Financial Times, 
November 6, 2017. 
                                                 
-30.00%
-20.00%
-10.00%
0.00%
10.00%
20.00%
30.00%
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
2
1
9
7
4
1
9
7
6
1
9
7
8
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
8
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
4
NFA/GDP IIP / GDP
